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WHAT DO WE LEARN?
ABSTRACT
We present a model where policies of free capital mobility can signal governments’ future
policies, but the informativeness of the signal depends on the path of world interest rates. Capital
flows to “emerging markets” reflect investors’ perception of these markets’ political risk. With low
world interest rates, emerging markets experience a capital inflow and engage in a widespread policy
of free capital mobility; with higher rates, only sufficiently committed countries allow free capital
mobility, whereas others impose controls to trap capital onshore, thus signaling future policies
affecting capital mobility. These predictions are consistent with the recent experience of capital
flows and policies affecting capital mobility in developing countries.
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If a country liberalizes capital movements, it is often viewed as signaling its commitment
to policies favorable to investment; to the extent it can differentiate itself from other countries
competing for funds, investors may respond favorably. What are individual countries’ incentives
to allow free capital mobility, when such policy is widespread? And what is the information
contained in a single country’s liberal policy, when most countries liberalize in response to
external developments?
In the late 1980s and early 1990s most Latin American and many other developing
countries significantly liberalized their economies. At the same time capital poured in, the inflow
from industrial countries rising from about $45 billion per year in 1985-88, to above $200 billion
in 1993.2 Despite its role in attracting foreign capital, financial liberalization was not the only
factor responsible for these massive inflows. Calve, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993, 1994), for
instance, provide evidence that external factors--mainly, the U.S. economic slowdown and fall in
interest rates--could explain perhaps half of the inflow experienced by Latin American countries
in the 1989-1992 period (see also Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi, 1993). Hence, both external
and domestic factors--less attractive investment opportunities in industrial countries, and stronger
commitment to free markets in many developing countries--led investors to search for higher
returns in Latin America and East Asia.
Beginning in late-1993, the ongoing U.S. expansion and European recovery led to a
reversal of capital flows between industrial and developing countries, while the supposed firm
commitment of some emerging economies to liberal policies was also suddenly called into
question. Capital flows to developing countries fell by one-fifth from 1993 to 1994, with the
2 See IMF (1996) for summary data on international capital flows.February 1994 rise in U.S. interest rates often viewed as the turning point. At the same time,
while some countries stayed the course to liberalization, others which had earlier liberalized (for
example, Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, and Nigeria) resorted to re-imposing capital controls or to
tightening existing regulations and delaying announced liberalization plans.~
Emerging markets’ experience with capital account policies since the late- 1980s motivates a
search for a more structural link between macroeconomic developments in industrial countries
and policies affecting capital mobility in developing countries. To this end, we compiled data on
capital controls from the IMF’s annual survey of Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions from 1970 to 1994, following the methodology of Epstein and Schor (1992) and
Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), among others. We defined three dummy variables, each taking
a value of one when a country was classified in the survey as restricting payments for capital
transactions, enforcing multiple exchange rates, or restricting repatriation of export proceeds in a
given year, respectively. Adding up over countries, and normalizing by (three times) the number
of countries, we constructed an index of capital controls in developing countries, ranging between
zero and one, roughly capturing the pervasiveness of the most common restrictions on capital
mobility. The index takes a value of one in any year if all countries enforce all three types of
restrictions in that year, and a value of zero if no such restriction is imposed anywhere in that
year. Our sample includes 73 developing countries surveyed from 1970 to 1994
there is complete data for the period, out of 162 developing countries). We also
(those for which
constructed a
measure of real (ex post) returns to capital in industrial countries by deflating average long-term
3 In the event, the previous meteoric rise of many emerging stock markets was matched by
an equally sharp fall. As one wag put it, it was at this point that he learned what “emerging
markets” really meant, when he discovered how difficult it was to emerge unscathed.
2interest rates in the G-7 countries with average GDP inflation rates.
Figure 1 plots the resulting capital controls index against the G-7 and U.S. long-term real
interest rates. The data underlying the plot is obviously crude, and the dynamics in mid-sample
strongly reflect the debt crisis of the early 1980s. Nevertheless, the correlation between the
capital controls and rate of return indices is striking.4 A 25-observation, time-series regression
of the capital controls index on the G-7 interest rate gave an r 2 of .65 and a t-statistic of 7:
industrial countries’ interest rates appear to be important determinants of developing countries’
liberalization decisions.5 The data also suggest a more general pattern of widespread liberaliza-
tions and massive inflows, subsequent policy reversals, and investors’ belated pledge to greater
selectivity the next time around: massive capital flows to developing countries in the late 1970s
were also associated with extensive liberalization in these countries; and the ensuing debt crisis
was also accompanied by a resurgence of restrictive policies.
In this paper we present a signaling model of policy choices that rationalizes the observed
link between world interest rates (and external macroeconomic events, more generally) and
policies affecting capital mobility in small open economies. When used to interpret the events of
the early-80s and early -90s, our model suggests a different view from the two views most
frequently offered of these episodes. According to one of these views, the rush of capital into
4 Among other shortcomings, our capital control index does not measure the intensity or
effectiveness of controls, nor does it distinguish between controls on inflows and outflows (though
restrictions are mainly on outflows). Similarly, nominal interest rates should be deflated by expected
(rather than actual) inflation. To the extent that actual inflation has typically fallen short of expected
inflation in most industrial countries since the early 1990s, the appropriate real rate of return series
would fall in this period below the ex post series plotted in Figure 1. Rapid progress toward liberal
markets in late-sample may also reflect structural changes not captured in our simple empirical
model, such as secular erosion in the effectiveness of capital controls.
5 Regressions using short-term rates and similarly constructed indices
very similar results. All data are available from the authors upon request.
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of capital restrictions gaveemerging markets was less than fully rational to begin with, reflecting instead a herd mentality
that led most investors to bet on anything exotic, without bothering to distinguish sound from
unsound investment opportunities. From this viewpoint, getting burned ex post was the natural
outcome of investors not being sufficient y discriminating ex ante. An alternative view is that the
dissimilar experience in bad times of countries that were similar in good times reflects country-
specific events or policy mistakes (such as Venezuela’s mishandling of its financial crisis in
1994, or Mexico’s unflinching exchange rate policy in 1992-93), rather than investors’ irrational
attitudes. Hence, it was rational to view most emerging markets as similar ex ante, but specific
shocks made them dissimilar ex post, causing some of them to falter on their path to reform.
Though both these views may contain elements of truth, neither is fully persuasive: the
first because appeals to irrationality prove satisfying to few economists; the second because the
evidence presented in Figure 1 (reinforced by that of Calve, Leiderman, and Reinhart for the
recent Latin American episode) suggests that the “similarity” between many emerging markets
may have been primarily in the external situation they faced, In this paper we argue that the
supposed indiscriminate character of periodic inflows into emerging markets, subsequent selective
outflows, and accompanying policy reversals, may be indicative neither of governments’ or
investors’ irrationality, nor of (some of the) recipient countries’ bad luck. They may simply
reflect investors’ optimal response to available information: when a common external shock
causes widespread adoption of 1iberal policies, it also reduces the information content of the
policy itself. Lacking information to discriminate, investors invest in all markets where policies
favorable to investment have been implemented, only to discover the weak commitment of some
countries to such policies, in the face of a subsequent adverse shock.
Our argument can be applied to structural reform in general. In deciding on structural
4policies, governments trade off costs and benefits, a trade-off that may depend on external
circumstances. “Good” times reduce the cost of reforms and cause their widespread adoption;
“bad” times induce only sufficiently motivated governments to reform. If a favorable
environment leads many countries to reform, investors may be unable to distinguish governments
truly committed to reform from those likely to renege on them in less favorable times, and
conversely when the environment is so adverse that no government implements reforms, Away
from the two extremes, some--but not all--governments will engage in structural reforms at any
given time, depending on the relevant trade-off between costs and benefits. The evolution of this
trade-off affects the information revealed to investors on the likely course of future policies in
different countries, and provides a channel for investment hysteresis. This channel, the revelation
of “innate” characteristics due to the changing external environment, is quite separate from those
of adjustment costs or multiple equilibria emphasized in previous research.
For concreteness, we develop this argument in a simple model of capital controls, though
we are well aware that balance of payment reform was only one element in the package of
reforms undertaken in recent years in many developing countries. In our model, governments’
attitudes toward capital mobility differ across countries and are imperfectly observable by
investors. Low world interest rates induce investment into emerging markets and promote free
capital mobility, by reducing the cost of this policy, A sufficiently low interest rate causes all
emerging countries to open their capital account, makes such policy uninformative of host
governments’ attitudes toward free capital mobility, and causes too much capital to be invested in
countries likely to impose controls in the future.
While our model shares many features with other signaling models, our analysis displays
the uncommon--and crucial--feature that the nature of the equilibrium (in particular, whether it is
5of a pooling or a separating type) varies over time in response to external shocks (an interest rate
shock in our case). In our model, investors know the process driving interest rates and
incorporate potential changes in the type of equilibrium in their investment decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. A simple signaling model, where investment and capital
control policies evolve endogenously in response to world interest rate shocks is presented in
Section 2 and solved in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the equilibrium and the effect of
interest rate shocks. Section 6 concludes, while the Appendix contains technical details.
2. The model
Our model extends the two-period model of capital controls of Bartolini and Drazen (1995)
to a full intertemporal model, relying on a somewhat more general model of governments’ costs
and utility of controls, and allowing for stochastic interest rates (on which government and
investors have the same information). Motivated by the discussion of Section 1, the model
incorporates a link between world interest rates and capital control policies in small open
economies, and differs from previous models of capital controls in a number of respects. First,
controls evolve endogenously from a governmen t‘s intertemporal choice problem in the face of
potential capital flows, rather than being imposed as an exogenous constraint.b Second, in
contrast with the traditional symmetric modelling of controls on inflows and outflows, our model
recognizes that real-world controls are typically asymmetric: stricter either on inflows or, more
frequently, on outflows. By modelling external shocks as outcomes from a stochastic process,
the model allows for endogenous switches in the type of equilibrium realized in each period.
b The implication of exogenous liberalizations for capital flows have, of course, been already
studied in the literature. See, for instance, Obstfeld (1986) and Bacchetta (1992).
6The possibility that different equilibria may be realized in each period is recognized by all agents,
and is reflected in equilibria realized earlier on.
Consider a T-period model of a small open economy, where a homogeneous good Y,is
produced at time twith onshore capital K, using a concave technology Y,=~(K,) that satisfies the
standard Inada conditions (other domestic factors that are internationally immobile are normalized
to unity). In each period, the supply of capital
interest rate rr. In this market, a large number
in the world market is perfectly elastic at the
of profit-maximizing, risk-neutral investors
allocate capital between onshore and offshore investment. Absent adjustment costs, and assuming
capital to be liquidated at the end of period T, the returns to physical and financial capital are
equalized and we shall make no distinction between the two.
The government derives utility from domestic capital in each period, as described by a
concave function W( K, ). This utility may reflect interest in residents’ utility from GDP, utility
from public expenditure financed from capital taxation, etc.7 Single-period utility is discounted
at the rate p and also satisfies the standard Inada regularity conditions.
Governments differ in the cost they attach to imposing capital controls. This heterogeneity
may reflect differences in the value attached to residents’ ability to diversify risk internationally,
different commitment to free markets, etc. Since our results do not depend on the specific source
of
as
this cost, but only on investors having incomplete information about them, we model this cost
simply as possible. We begin by assuming that the government assigns a one-time cost
x= (O, ~ ) to imposing controls the first time it imposes controls, and no further cost thereafter,
7 The government’s welfare may also depend on arguments other than the stock of domestic
capital. Therefore, this welfare function is best interpreted as an indirect utility function, other
variables having been set optimally at each K,.
7and refer to x as a government’s type. (The cost x does not include the reputational cost of
controls, which is central to our analysis and is discussed explicitly below.) The assumption of a
one-time cost can be rationalized by interpreting x as the cost of breaking an international
agreement to allow free capital mobility, the cost of face-loss, or other costs incurred when
reneging on a policy commitment (as in Rogoff, 1987, for instance, where governments assign a
one-time cost to breaking a commitment to zero inflation). In our model, this assumption plays
the role of making capital controls permanent once imposed, thereby greatly simplifying the
exposition, and allowing us to highlight the model’s main insight. In a later section, however, we
discuss how the solution is modified in a more general setting.
We model asymmetric information about x by assuming that only the government is
informed about x as of time zero,
observation of actual policies and
while investors must infer this characteristic based on the
their prior cumulative probability distribution, G(x), over types.
Table 1 summarizes the timing of the model. The initial stock KOand distribution G(x)
describe the initial state. At the beginning of each period, both the government and investors are
informed of the current world interest rate r(, as drawn (independently, for simplicity) from the
cumulative distribution M(r). After observing r~, the government announces the financial
regime prevailing in the current period. (We use the dummy
in period t, letting Cf=F and c1=R denote free and restricted
are imposed at t, the end-of-period stock of domestic capital,
Ct to denote the regime
mobility, respectively. )
K,, is constrained to be




gWe focus exclusively on controls on capital ouflows. Given the government’s taste for
domestic capital, there are no incentives to impose controls on inflows in this model. We also
focus on the case in which capital controls are fully effective. The tendency for capital controls
to lose effectiveness in the long run (see, for instance, Mathieson and Rojas-Su6rez, 1993, for a
8announced, investors choose Kt accordingly, and collect the resulting returns.9
In the next section we solve this model recursively backward, and derive a unique
equilibrium for each period t given the solution for period t+ 1. Since the solution is somewhat
technical, however, it may be useful to summarize its intuition here.
Consider investment and capital controls decisions in a single country. In the final period
T, if the host government does not impose controls, the marginal product of onshore capital is
equalized to the current world interest rate, yielding K~ =($ ’)-1(r~). If controls are imposed,
instead, the domestic capital stock equals the larger of the unconstrained stock and the previous
period’s stock, K~_l. Thus, the actual capital stock depends on the regime chosen by the
government for this period. To examine this policy, first observe that a standard backward
recursion argument implies that once a government imposes controls in any period, it will
certainly impose controls until period T.10 On the other hand, the optimal period T policy of
discussion) can be accommodated by re-writing the capital control constraint as K,> ( 1 -5) K,.,,
where 5 captures the rate at which controls can be circumvented in each period. The analysis
then remains qualitatively unchanged, as long as 8<1, i.e., as long as controls are at least
partially effective in the short run. However, a further bias toward liberalization would be
induced by the assumed leakiness of controls. In the limit, as 5+ 1, controls become fully
ineffective, and all incentives to impose them vanish.
9 For simplicity, we abstract from other policies often undertaken in conjunction with capital
controls, policies that usually include taxation of domestic capital, interest rate ceilings, and other
forms of “financial repression” that penalize foreign investors in addition to capital controls (see
Giovannini and De Melo, 1993, for a discussion, as well as for evidence in support of the joint
use of capital controls and financial repression in developing countries). As in Bartolini and
Drazen (1995), these motives could be captured by allowing the host government to levy a tax on
onshore capital, assuming that tax revenues are transformed into public expenditure, and letting
government’s utility be increasing in the supply of public goods.
10Since a government that has already imposed controls faces no further cost from doing so
again at T, itcertainly imposes controls at T, thereby maximizing K~ at no cost. But this implies
that no cost would be incurred also at T-1, if controls have been already imposed in the past:
neither a direct nor a reputational cost (since the government is already known to use controls for
sure at ~. Then controls are always imposed at T-1, and so on, recursively backward.
9governments that have not previously imposed controls is summarized by thetype fT=~T(~T_i, YT)
that is indifferent between imposing controls (yielding utility W(K~ IR) -x) and not imposing
controls (yielding W(K~ IF) ). Hence, i~= W{K~_l)-W((~’)-]( VT) ). Governments with cost x <i~
impose controls, those with cost X22T allow free mobility of capital, unless they have imposed
controls in a previous period, in which case they impose controls also at T.
The equilibrium in periods t<T has similar properties. In comparing onshore and offshore
returns, however, investors must consider the likelihood that controls may be imposed in the
future. If controls have been observed in the past, this likelihood is, trivially, equal to one. If,
instead, free capital mobility has prevailed until t, the likelihood of future controls depends on the
residual uncertainty over government types, as summarized by the range of “possible” types,
those that may have carried out a policy of free capital mobility before t. This range evolves, as
specified below, as a function of the external macroeconomic environment.
The government’s optimal policy in period t is also similar to that for period T, and is
summarized by the cut-off type f~ that is indifferent between imposing and not imposing controls
at t,conditional on it not having previously imposed controls. Types x below the cut-off type
impose controls at t and thereafter; types above the cut-off type impose controls at tonly if they
have already imposed controls in the past.
In equilibrium, and focussing on the case where the commitment to free mobility has not
yet been reneged upon, the set of “possible” types (those who have not yet imposed controls at t)
evolves as a function of world interest rates. In each period, investors compare the cut-off type
it to the current possible set [~t, ~ ], and update this set based on the observed policy. If
controls are imposed, they will be in place forever after, and there is no more updating of
information. If controls are not imposed, then this policy reveals that x>i~, and the posterior
10possible set becomes [x =max {i, ,~f, ~]. Interestingly, if the cut-off point falls below the —1+1
possible set of types (i(<~,), then no possible type imposes controls at t : the equilibrium is of a
pooling type, and a policy of free capital mobility is uninformative. Similarly in subsequent
periods.
The evolution of the economy may also be described in terms of the path of interest rates.
Suppose free mobility has prevailed in the host country in all previous periods. Define by
?l =?t(K,_l ,Zl) the interest rate at which the worst possible type at time t,Z[, is indifferent
between imposing and not imposing controls in this period, given Kt_l and the history of previous
policies (summarized by z,). For r,<?,, no possible type would impose controls, and a policy of
free capital mobility is uninformative. For r,>?,, types x below the cut-off f, impose controls,
while types exceeding this cut-off do not: only interest rates in this range allow investors to use
the observed policy to refine their knowledge of the government faced in the host country.
We now proceed to derive these properties more precisely in the next section.
3. Technical Solution
The model can be solved recursively backward, beginning with a closed-form solution for
period T. We focus directly on market equilibrium conditions, and obtain a unique equilibrium
for each period t given the solution for period t+1. We adopt a standard equilibrium concept,
that of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, which requires each agent’s choice to be optimal given his
beliefs and other agents’ actions and beliefs, and that beliefs be updated in each period according
to Bayes’ rule, whenever this applies (i.e., whenever the probability of the conditioning event is
not zero). (See Persson and Tabellini, 1990, for a detailed discussion, also in relation to other
equilibrium concepts adopted in the macroeconomic signaling literature. )
113.1. Period T: Investors’ Policy.
marginal returns from offshore and
VT=1+~’(K~), respectively, which
With free capital mobility, profit maximization equalizes the
onshore investment at T. These are given by R~=1+VT,and
include principal and scrap value of a unit of capital at the
1
end of the period. Discounting returns at the rate the stock of capital invested onshore is
~’
K;( r~)s(~’)-l( r~), decreasing in r~ due to the concavity of ~(.).
If capital controls
maximizing solution, as
are in place at T, instead, investors may be unable to attain the profit-
the domestic stock of capital must satisfy the constraint K~>K~_l. For
r~ <~’ (K~_l), controls are not binding, and the unconstrained solution prevails; for r~>~’ (K~_l),
instead, controls are binding, and the corner solution K~=K~_~ prevails.
3.2. Period T: Government’s Policy. The government’s optimal policy can be studied by
characterizing the trigger type ~1=~~(K~_,,r~) that is just indifferent between imposing and not
imposing controls at T when VT >~’ (K~_[), conditional on having not previously imposed controls.
i~ is the unique solution for x of the equation
PIW’(KTICT=R) ‘x - W(KTIF)] =0> ~T>f’(~T_, ) , (1)
where, recall, p is the government’s discount factor. Equation (1) implies
~T(~T_l !~~ ) = w(~,-,) -
The trigger f~ =~~( K~_l,r~) is a continuous and
w((f’)-’(~T)) ~ (2)
increasing function of K~_, and rT, and
governments imposing capital controls are those for which x <IT. These are intuitive properties:
with a sufficient] y high offshore rate, free capital mobility would lead to a capital outflow, thus
tempting the government to impose controls. This temptation is stronger the larger is the amount
12of capital K~_l–K;( r~) that can be potentially trapped onshore, and, therefore, the higher are
either K~_l or r~. Free capital mobility prevails when the cost of imposing controls x is
sufficiently high to outweigh the utility gain from trapping capital onshore.
The nature of the equilibrium in period T then depends on policies realized up to time T.
further cost in imposing
when VT >f’ (KT_,). (Without
As noted above, if capital controls have been imposed at any time prior to T, they are also
imposed at T, irrespective of the specific value of f~: there is no
controls at T, but this policy maximizes the period T capital stock
loss of generality, we assume that when indifferent between imposing and not imposing controls,
governments maintain the policy chosen in the previous period).
If free capital mobility has prevailed until T, instead, the form of the equilibrium depends
on the relationship between i~ and the set of types that may have chosen such policy, given the
observed path of world interest rates. As we shall see shortly, this set has the form of an interval
[~T, ~]. Accordingly, if i,<~~, a pooling equilibrium without controls prevails: the world
interest rate is not sufficiently high to trigger a capital outflow sufficient to justify controls, even
for the lowest possible type, ~~. If 1~ >~~, instead, then a separating equilibrium prevails: types
in the range [~~,~~) impose controls; types in the range [i~, ~] allow free capital mobility.
Equilibria in periods t<T will exhibit very similar properties, with the added feature that
separating equilibria allow investors to truncate a set of types from the current possible set.
3.3. Period t equilibrium. In each period t,investors compute the expected returns from onshore
investment by considering the likelihood that capital controls may be imposed in the future. If
controls are in place in period t, they will certainly be in place in the future as well. If controls
are not in place at t,instead, the likelihood of future controls depends on investors’ current
13beliefs over government types. These beliefs are fully summarized by the set of types that are
possible at time t,i.e., those types that may have allowed free mobility until t. Our first task,
accomplished by Proposition 1, is to show that this set is described by a range [x _t, ~], the
convexity of which reflects the trigger nature of government policies in each period. In order to
prove Proposition 1, we must first set up the government’s problem in period t.
Consider type x’s decision at t,and denote its utility from pursuing the policy C[= (F, R }
as
T
w,(~1_,1~t)c,7_f x ,x) = E,~ p“-’+l~(K,, Ic,) - E1~ p“-’+’~I(K,, Ic,), (3)
,y=~ ,f=f
where I(.) is an indicator function that takes the value of one the first time controls are imposed,
and zero otherwise; and the expectations are taken over {rl+l, .,. ,r~ } and over the corresponding
contingent strategies chosen by x at every node.
The choice of a government x that has not previously imposed controls is whether or not to
impose controls in the current period t,given K,_l, i-r, and ~L. Type x’s gain from reneging at
time t on its commitment to free capital mobility, rather than postponing any such decision to a
future period, is
v,(~(_, ,~,,c, =R,z,,x) - vl(~,_i, ~,, ct=F,z,, x) (4)
Type x imposes controls for the first time, in the first period for which this difference
becomes positive. Proposition 1 shows that if a type x chooses not to impose controls at t,then
every higher type would do the same:
Proposition 1: If type x‘ does not impose controls at t,neither does any type x” >X’.
Proposition 1 (whose proof is in Appendix) is intuitive: if x‘ chooses to postpone the time
14it first imposes controls, so would x” , whose cost-saving from such postponement is higher, and
direct utility gain is at least as large. Proposition 1 allows us to summarize governments’ policy
in each period by a trigger rule, whereby types lower than a cut-off il =fl (K~_l,r[,~[) impose
controls at t, if they have not previously imposed controls, while types exceeding i, do not,
unless they have previously imposed controls. The cut-off type i, is defined as the lowest type
not to impose controls at t. Being indifferent between imposing and
~, satisfies W1(Kl_l,rl)R,z~,f,) - VI(K,-l irf,F,zf,~,) =0, identically.
not imposing controls at t,
To solve investors’ problem, first note that the expected marginal return from investing
offshore at t,denoted by R[, includes the current interest rate rl, as well as the discounted
[1 yf+Ef R(+l
expectation of future returns to being offshore at t+ 1, R,=
1+r, “
Based on the trigger nature of government policies implied by Proposition 1, we can
formalize investors’ inference problem by means of a conditional distribution G (x Ic,,i, ,3,)
cumulated over types up to the unique cut-off for period t+ 1, i,+l.
from investing onshore in period t,V,, can then be expressed as a
a continuation value function for period t+1 returns, as
The expected marginal return
function of current returns and
[ f’(K,)+Er[Rr+l]Pr(c,+, =F lC,,fl,Zf) +Pr(cf+l ‘R IC1,ft,Zt)”Et v,+l ICf,~,,Zt
v,(K,, rt, ct,i,,~l) = 1
l+r,
f’(~,) +E,[R,+, ]-E,[R,+, -v,+, (~,, ~,+,,R)]pr(c,+, =R lC1,~,,Z,)
—
1 +r,
f’(~,) +E,[R,+,] _ — —
J
‘t+I-vf+f+:’rt+l’R) G(i,+,(K[,rt+, ) lC,>f,73[)dM(r,+I) ‘ (5)
l+rf
r,+, 1
where the notation for Vf+l reflects its independence of ir+l and Z,+l when c1,~=R, since in this
case controls become certain in all future periods.
15In (5), the cumulative distribution G(f,+[ Icl,il ,3,) is the probability of controls in period
t+l conditional on policies observed up to period t. Clearly, if c,= R, then G (i,+, Ic, =R ,if,~t)
equals one: as soon as controls are imposed, the type is revealed to lie in the range [~,, i,), and
the likelihood of controls in all subsequent periods becomes unity.
The case where c, =F is more interesting for our purposes. If 1,<~, (that is, if all possible
types allow free capital mobility at t), then the distribution G (2,+1Ic, =F, i, ,~1) conditional on no
controls before period t,collapses into the distribution G (f[+, Icl_~=F ,f[_l ,~f_l) conditional on no
controls before period t-1. (For period one, this is the unconditional distribution G(.).)
If f,>~(, instead, the probability of Cl+l=R is obtained by Bayes’ rule as
G(i,+, )-G(~,+, )
G(i,+, lc,=F,it,~, ) =
1-G(~[+l )
(6)
for states r,+l where i >X
1+1 —f+l 7 and as G(fl+l Ic,=F,i~,~l) =0 for states rr+l where ff+l<x —t+l
(Recall that viewed from period t, if+, is a random variable that depends on the yet unknown
r,+,.) Furthermore, since the choice c, =F reveals the true type to lie in the range [if, ~ ], then
_,+l=21 in (6): the distribution G(fl+l I x c~,i~,3 ) and the cut-off x evolve as a function of r~, as 1 —t
investors truncate from the “possible” set, types that could not have chosen the observed policy,
Now denote by K,*(V,,c,,i, ,1,) the (unconstrained) profit-maximizing capital stock, defined
as the solution for K~ of
Given either ct=F or CI=R, V, is a continuous function of K( and r,, going from infinity
for Kf+ O to zero for K,+ 00. It is also apparent from (5) and (6) that if i,+, is increasing in K,
(which is true for t= T, and is shown to be true at t,recursively, in Proposition 2) then R[-V, is
16increasing in Kr. Therefore, (7) yields a unique solution for the unconstrained profit-maximizing
capital stock, Kt”(r[, ct,fl, ~t), and Proposition 2 holds (proof is in the Appendix):
Proposition 2: f, is increasing in K,_l and in r,.
Propositions 1 and 2 have an important corollary: (z,, 2,] may be empty, that is, there may
be interest rates r, so low, that no possible type switches from free mobility to controls at t. To
see this, define by ?,= it( K,.l ,z, ) the interest rate that satisfies Vf(K,_l, ~1,R ,Zf,Zl) -
wf(~[-,l~t> F,~t,~l) -0 identically. ” At f,, the worst possible type at time t, x is indifferent —1 ‘
between imposing and not imposing controls, given K,.l. At ?, and at lower rates, no
government that had not previously imposed controls would impose controls. Thus, for r,< ?[,
the policy observed in period tdoes not help investors refine their knowledge of government
types and, hence, their forecast of future returns to investment.
Equations (5) and (7) also imply that any rise in G(2,+l (K,, rt+l) Ic,,i,,~,) (that is, any
increase in the conditional probability of low government types) reduces the expected returns to
K, and hence K,* itself (formally, K,”(r,, F ,ff,~,) > K(”(r,, R ,2, ,3,) ). Combined with Proposition 1
and with the effect of capital controls on investors’ ability to withdraw capital from the host
country, this implies that K,= K,. ~ with controls, and Kf = K,*(rf, c1=F ,i[ ,~t) with free capital
mobility. Indeed, for il > x controls must be binding at t(that is, Kf= K(.l ): no government —f ‘
would renege on its commitment to free capital mobility unless controls are binding. Imposing
controls implies a direct cost x and, by Proposition 1, (5), and (7), also a reputational cost of
revealing the government to be of a type lower than ft
11The properties of V,, noted above, and the assumed regularity of W(. ) assure that ?, is a
well defined interest rate between O and ~.
17Finally, note that as long as the probability of controls at t +1, G(i,+l(K, ,rf+l) Ic,,f[ ,Z[), is
greater than zero, then Equation (5) incorporates a “political premium” which compensates
investors for the possibility of future controls. This premium arises because with capital controls
and high realizations of rl, the return to
to investing offshore. In order to offset
investing onshore would fall below the expected return
this potential loss (i.e., in order to equalize the present
discounted streams of expected returns R, and V,), risk-neutral investors require the current
return to onshore investment, f‘ (Kf), to exceed the current return to offshore investment, rr,
before investing onshore. Thus, as long as G(fl+l(K,,r,+l) lc[,ff,~f)>O, then
J( R,+l-Vl+l(K1,rf+l,R))d M(rf+l) >0 and Equations (5) and (7) imply that f ‘( K[)>r, for c1=F.
r,.,
The wedge f‘ (K,) -r, is our model’s analog of the “political” premium identified empirically by
Dooley and Isard (1980) and subsequent related studies.
4. Learning from Observed Policies and the Effect of Interest Rate Shocks
The model’s equilibrium in period t,illustrated in Figure 2, can be summarized as follows.
In each period following a history of free capital mobility, world interest rates can take values
over two ranges, which depend on the policy history and on the existing capital stock: a low
range r,<f[, where all possible Vpes of governments (i.e., those types whose cost of controls is
consistent with not having imposed controls up to period t)allow unrestricted capital flows; and,
a high range rf> ?f, where low x types impose controls (thereby trapping K,.]- K,”(r,, R, 2,,3, )),
while high x types allow free capital mobility. Only for these interest rates is the observation of
policies informative, in that it allows investors to refine their perception of government types, and
hence improve their forecast of future policies and returns to investment. This split of interest
rates into “high” and “low” ranges has interesting implications for policies and investment in
18individual countries, and for the efficiency of capital allocation acrosx countries. We begin by
discussing the former.
Figure 2 plots the inherited capital stock, K,.l, and the desired capital stock in period tas a
function of the world interest rate r,, both with free and restricted capital mobility. The desired
stock conditional on free mobility, Kl*(rf, F, 2[,~t), lies above its restricted mobility counterpart,
K,*(r,, R ,if ,~1), for each r, in the range of interest rates [?,, ~ ] that supports a separating
equilibrium, This wedge reflects the discrete upward revision in investors’ beliefs over
government types, triggered by the observation of free capital mobility in period t (which allows
investors to truncate the set of possible types to the range [fl, ~ ]), and the associated revision in
expected returns to K,. Conversely in response to the imposition of controls.
Note that the existing stock K,_l intersects the free-mobility curve at rl”, to the left of ?(:
no government imposes controls unless they are strictly binding. In fact, there are two reasons
why rfo< ;t. First,
minimum amount,
capital controls entail a cost x> O: prospective outflows must then exceed a
before a government decides to incur their cost. A signaling motive associated
to investors’ incomplete information over governments also contributes to r 0<;,: it is to a
government’s advantage to tolerate a larger outflow of capital than with common knowledge of
its type, so as to provide to investors more favorable information on future business conditions in
the host country. Thus, some governments allow free capital mobility in situations where they
would have imposed controls had their type been known to investors, to mimic better types and
signal their difference from worse types. Incomplete information about
toward capital controls provides a bias toward liberal capital markets. 12
governments’ attitudes
12A formal argument for this signaling result could be given. We omit details, however, as
our focus is on the evolution of information on future policies over time, rather than on policy
19Consider now the effects of an interest rate in the “separating” range r,>?,. If the host
government liberalizes capital flows, an outflow K,.l -Kf”(V,,F ,it,~,) occurs at t. With capital
controls, instead, an amount K,_l–Kl”(rl, R ,i, ,~~) of capital is trapped onshore, as K, =K1_l. In
this case, however, the separating nature of the equilibrium allows investors to sharpen their
knowledge of the host government, by restricting its possible type to the range [~t ,~,] in the case
of controls, and to the range [if, ~ ] in the case of free mobility. In the former case, the
probability of future controls conditional on c1=R rises (to unity, in our simple model) with
respect to its prior probability, while the probability of future controls conditional on c,= F falls.
By allowing free capital mobility, governments in the range [f,, ~ ] can build their reputation for
aversion to capital controls. This signal is costly in the current period (a capital outflow must be
tolerated), but it raises the desired capital stock in each future period, allowing capital inflows in
states where capital outflows would have otherwise occurred.’s
What happens, instead, when the interest rate r, is lower than f,? Now all possible types
allow free capital mobility, and capital flows equal Kf*(rf, F ,it, It )-K1_, (positive when i-l<rt”,
and negative when r~o<rl< ?l). No information on future policies is revealed to investors. ‘q
This solution has implications for the pattern of capital flows across countries in response
biases at any given time. Bartolini and Drazen (1995) further discuss these issues, though in the
context of a model with a different information structure,
‘3Specifically, in each period t,K,”(r,, F ,~1,~ ) is higher than it would have been with
controls replacing no controls in any previous peri~d.
14Viewing the existence of separating and pooling equilibria in terms of high and low values
of r, suggests a formalization of the notion that “tough” (that is, high r[) times may benefit
“tough” (that is, high x) types, by allowing these to separate themselves from weak types. The
idea that information about future policies conveyed by current policies may depend on both the
degree of uncertainty about a policy maker’s type and the circumstances in which he finds himself
was suggested by Drazen and Masson (1994).
20to interest rate shocks. Consider a world with two groups of economies: a large number of
“emerging markets”, i,e., small economies of the type described in Section 2, and the “rest of the
world”, where the supply of capital is elastic at the rate rf in each period. Suppose, for the
moment, that all emerging markets are identical at the beginning of period t-1. (That is, let all of
them be characterized by the same production technology, same prior distribution G(x) for
government types, and same history of policies up to period t-1.) Under these assumptions, each
country is exactly described by the model of Section 2, and the critical value of ?f_, is the same
for all countries. For illustration, consider the case of a period t (the present) where the world
interest rate is sufficiently low to spur a large inflow of capital into all emerging markets, thereby
supporting a policy of widespread free capital mobility (i.e., rl<?~). In this period, investors have
the opportunity to allocate capital for maximum returns in period t+ 1 and onward (the ~utuve), in
light of events observed up to period t-1(the past).
Consider the impact of past interest rates on current investment, beginning with the case of
a “low” rate at t-1,which we take as a stylized description of industrial countries’ (mainly the
U.S,’) interest rates in the late 1980s and, to an even greater extent, in the late 1970s. The upper
panel of Figure 3 gives an example of this pattern. (For simplicity, but with no relevance for our
discussion, the figure displays Fl_l, ?,, and ;,+l as if these were the same),
If r,_lS ?,_l and r,<?,, then all countries allow free capital mobility at both t-1 and t, and
(since all countries are identical a priori) receive the same investment flow at t,despite the
underlying--but unobservable--difference in x and in the likelihood of future controls: all-round
liberalization at t-1has destroyed the information content of the observed policy. For this
outcome to obtain, investors need not believe the interest rate shock, nor the policy of free
mobility, to be permanent. They know that a sufficiently high future interest rate will induce
21some countries to impose controls.
What happens if, indeed, the future interest rate, r,+,, rises to above ;,+l? First, the profit-
maximizing stock of onshore capital falls, causing a desired outflow of capital from all emerging
markets. Second, countries whose government assigns a relatively low cost to abandoning free
capital mobility, impose controls on outflows. As a result, investors are trapped in some
countries, earning a low rate of return. In our example, an amount of capital equal to
Kt*(rt, F, f,,~t)-Kf;l(r,+i, R ,1,+1,~f+l) is trapped in countries with controls at t+l. Ex post, the
world’s allocation of capital is inefficient. In fact, this allocation is more inefficient (in the sense
that a larger amount of capital is trapped in countries with controls) than it would be, had a
separating equilibrium prevailed at t-1, a point that we now illustrate.
Consider an alternative interest rate path, where the interest rate at t-1, r,_l, exceeds ?,_l,
and the rates at t and t+ 1 remain the same as before (the bottom panel of Figure 3 illustrates this
case) .15 In this case, some governments impose controls at t-1, thus allowing investors to refine
their prior information over government types: investors recognize types imposing controls as
belonging to the range [x _l_l,~t-l ), and those allowing free capital mobility as belonging to the
range [f,.,, CO]. When interest rates fall at t,high x countries are rewarded with larger
investment at tthan they would have been in our previous example, as their type as been
narrowed to a smaller range [~,, ~ ]. Low x countries, their attempt to mimic higher types
having been foiled at t-1, share to a smaller extent (or not at all) in the investment boom. ‘b
15Strictly speaking, because ?, depends on r,.,, we need r, to be lower than the ?r realized
on both paths, and r,+, to be higher than the ?[+l realized on both paths for our illustrative
discussion to remain valid.
16The extent of the fall in r, determines whether low-x countries share in the investment
boom. The assumed concavity of the onshore production function ~( Kf), in particular, implies
that it is not optimal to direct all new flows to high-x countries for sufficiently low rates r,.
22When interest rates rise at t+ 1, an amount of capital Kl”(rf,R ,i, ,~f) -K,~l(rl+l, R ,fl+l,z[+i) (smaller
than in the previous example, possibly nil), is trapped in low x countries. More capital
(reflecting the higher cut-off ~,+1 overcome by these types) is invested
for a given rl, a period t-1interest rate above ?(_l, enhances investors’
efficiently at t,by investing less in low x countries and more in high x
in high x countries. Thus,




adjustment costs are needed for this information-based hysteresis property,
results would hold in a more general model where emerging markets differ by
production technology, prior distribution of x, or policy history, Countries endowed with more
productive technologies would clearly attract more capital. The world interest rate that supports
free capital mobility by all types would be country-specific, and the actual interest rate would
have to be below the minimum of these for all countries to allow free capital mobility. If the
prior distribution of types or policy history differs across countries, the analysis is similar and
yields the country-specific triggers i, and ?(. Even if the interest rate in each period is so low
that no country restricts capital movements, more capital is invested in countries whose prior
distribution lies, roughly speaking, further to the right, as future controls are less likely in these
countries. A sufficiently low world interest rate would cause all emerging markets to experience
an inflow, with more capital being attracted to countries perceived as more averse to controls.
5. More general specifications of the model
A crucial assumption of the model that we have discussed is that imposing capital controls
involves a one-time cost, an assumption which implies that controls, once imposed, are never
lifted. This prediction is similar to that of many monetary games in the literature, where
uncertainty about government taste for output and inflation causes some governments to choose
23zero inflation up to a certain time, only to revert to positive inflation forever after. Certainly, in
the case of capital controls, this prediction is unrealistic.
Our motivation for choosing a simple cost structure was tractability and transparency of
results. When a cost is incurred whenever controls are in place, the government’s strategy space
become too rich to permit a simple description of policies and of their response to shocks.
Governments attaching higher costs to controls, for instance, may (counter-intuitively) impose
controls earlier than low-cost governments, for the cost of discouraging investment early on, is
offset by a reduced frequency of controls in the long run. In general, the properties of policies
and investment become difficult to study, given the scope for complicated sequences of periods
with and without controls, unless one commits to simple functional forms for W(.), ~(.), G(.), and
M(.) or to other simplifying assumptions, One can still show that ve~ low world interest rates
would cause all possible governments to liberalize at any given time, thereby destroying the
information content of a liberalization. At the opposite end, and as a more interesting implication
of the more general model, ve~ high interest rates would cause all possible governments to
impose controls, thereby equally destroying the information content of the observed policy.
Nevertheless, the more general model becomes almost untractable for intermediate interest rates,
and multiple equilibria (among other complications) become possible for this range of rates.
One approach to addressing the unrealistic policies implied by our model, while retaining
its tractability, is as follows. In every period up to time T, a government faces a probability u of
being terminated (like a Blanchard-type consumer faces a positive probability of dying in each
period) and of being replaced by another government drawn from the set [~,;]. A change in
governments is common knowledge, but the new value of x is not, as in our basic model. Thus,
when a new government takes office, its choice problem and investors’ inference problem begin
24anew. In particular, a new government faces the same problem faced at time zero in our basic
model, and allows free capital mobility for sufficiently low interest rates or a sufficiently high x.
The formal structure of the extended model is very similar to that of our basic model. The
solution for period T remains identical, while the government’s problem at t< T is modified only
by replacing the discount factor p with (1 -a) p. Investors’ inference problem becomes only
slightly more difficult: the set of possible types in power is still truncated to [max {ir,~l },~ ] in
response to a policy of free capital mobility, but a probability a is attached to a new government
coming to office and to the set of possible types being reset to [~,;]. Thus capital controls need
not last forever, when imposed, but only until the next switch of government. 17 The marginal
return to onshore investment should also reflect the possibility of government turnover, as in
E,[R,+I] _J
R[+l-V,+l(K1,r(+,,R)
V,(K1, r,, ct,it,~l) = f’(K1) +
l+r[ , l+r,
,.,
Propositions 1 and 2 hold unchanged in the extended model, and its qualitative properties,
conditional on current governments remaining in oflice, also remain unchanged. In fact, the
dependence of investment on the history of world interest rates persists beyond governments’
lifetimes, via the stock of capital bequeathed from one government to the next. 18
17In fact, government “changes” might be viewed, more broadly, as credible breaks with old
policies, breaks often pursued by finance ministers at the onset of liberalization programs.
Naturally, this broader interpretation should address the issue of what makes these policy breaks
credible.
‘EIn an even more general model, the probability of survival 1-a would be itself endogenous
to policies. In practice, we would expect the imposition of capital controls to have secondary and
ambiguous effects on governments’ survival, as capital controls typically harm the interest of
some constituencies (e.g., investors) while benefiting those of others (e.g,, wage-earners).
25Despite its somewhat ad hoc flavor, this extension does capture some interesting features of
an extended model with government turn-over. It also highlights an important requirement for
our model’s insight to emerge: some amount of persistence in government types is necessary for
information acquisition to matter at all in our model. In general, the faster is governments’ turn-
over, the less relevant are observed policies to signal the course of future policies, while
governments become less concerned with the adverse information impact of imposing capital
controls. In the limit, if a= 1, then governments last for only one period; expected returns to
onshore investment and the allocation of capital across countries become independent of past
policies; and governments’ decision problem collapses into a myopic one-shot problem.
Although lack of a closed-form solution when u>O prevents explicit comparative statics analysis,
the vanishing of “bad-signal” effects as u+ 1 (that is, the vanishing of G(~,+l(K,,rf+l) IC, ,f, ,3,)
from Equation (8)), suggests that governments with shorter horizon should be more likely to
abandon free capital mobility than governments with a longer horizon.
Another approach to generalizing the basic model and incorporate more realistic costs of
capital controls, would be to simplify drastically the state space for government types, for
example, to two types, as is common in macroeconomic signaling models. Further assuming one
of these two types to be a “hard-nosed” government irrevocably committed to free capital
mobility (see Barro, 1986, and Backus and Driffill, 1985, for the equivalent assumption in the
context of monetary policy games), x can take two values, x= {~, ~ ], with probabilities G and
1-G, respectively, instead of all values in the interval [~, m]. A payoff to this simplification is
that we can let the cost of controls, x, to be incurred every time controls are imposed, while still
obtaining a tractable model. Though we omit details, it is clear that until capital controls are
imposed for the first time, investors face essentially the same inference problem as in our basic
26model. Investment still displays information-based hysteresis and, since low x types always face
a meaningful trade-off between controls and free capital mobility, this model produces a more
realistic pattern of capital controls, with controls imposed and lifted in response to changes in
world interest rates. The main cost of this simplification would be reversion to full information
as soon as controls are imposed for the first time (for this policy identifies the government as a
low x type). In reality, however, one would not expect a government to last forever, and a
combination of this and the previous model is likely to provide a reasonable characterization of
actual policies. In spite of the difficulty of obtaining stronger results in a model that is both
general and tractable, the insight that very favorable and very adverse external environments
should make observed policies less informative of future policies (in that all governments tend to
act uniformly in these circumstances), seems a robust one.
6. Concluding Remarks
Recent developments in capital flows from industrial to developing countries and in
policies affecting international capital mobility, confirm a pattern emerged in recent decades,
whereby liberal policies in developing countries have been implemented mainly during periods of
low interest rates in industrial countries and large capital flows toward developing countries, and
vice versa. In this paper we have presented a simple model of endogenous capital account




main results concern the link between the nature of the model’s
equilibrium and external shocks, taken here to be a world interest rate shock: “low” world
interest rates support capital flows toward emerging markets and an equilibrium where all these
27countries allow free capital mobility; “high” interest rates support an equilibrium where countries
with governments highly committed to liberal policies distinguish themselves by allowing free
capital mobility, while countries with less committed governments trap capital onshore by
imposing controls on capital outflows. In equilibrium, information on the likely course of future
policies revealed to investors reflects the path of world interest rates: a period of low interest
rates in industrial countries supports widespread adoption of free capital mobility, but prevents
investors from discriminating among different policy environments. Should interest rates later
rise, investors may find themselves as having invested too much in countries that were not truly
committed to free capital mobility. This outcome is consistent with investors’ recognizing the
potential temporariness of external shocks and policies.
To sharpen our analysis, we focussed on a specific source of political risk: the imposition
of restrictions on capital mobility in the wake of adverse external shocks. Though many would
view capital controls as a primary source of political risk for international investors, we view our
study only as a tackle to a more general issue: the link between the information content of
structural reform and the macroeconomic environment. We feel, in particular, that our model’s
insight should extend beyond the case of capital controls, to situations where governments can
undertake a variety of reforms, and have access to multiple signals of commitment to such
reforms. When governments have private information on their utility from reform, and the cost
of reform depends on the external environment, good times are likely to reduce these costs, lead
to widespread reform, and diminish these policies’ usefulness as signals of future policies; bad
times are likely to lead to policy reversal, and to investors’ regretting prior investment decisions.
28Table 1. Time structure of the model
time =0 : - Inherited stock of capital, KO.
- x is drawn from G(x) and revealed only to the government.
time =t< T: - r, is drawn from M(r) and revealed.
- Government chooses c, l {F, R}.
- Public chooses K, (with Kf2K,_1 if c, =R) and collects profits.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We show that if x‘ chooses c, =F, then x” also chooses c1=F, if
x” >X’ for two possible types at t,since x” prefers to mimic x ‘‘s strategy (including Cf=F)
than choosing c, =R (and c,,=R, s> t,thereafter). To see this, write type x’s welfare function ~[
as
v[(~,_, j~,lct>_,, x x) = w,(x) - pfx) ,
where
T T
and ~l(x) <x, since p <1 and the probabilities add to unity.
Now, let x‘ choose c, =F, and compare the payoff to x” from following x‘’s contingent
strategy, to that from imposing controls at t and choosing c,,=R thereafter. We have:
~,(K,_l, r,, c,= F,~,,x” Iat x“S strategy)
= Wfx’)- pf(x”) : x‘’s strategy at x” ‘s cost
2 WJX’’ )-X’+ pfx’)- pl(x”) : by clef, of x‘’s optimal policy
29[ 1 = WJX’’ )-X”+ (x’’ -x’)- pJx’’ -)’) :
> WJX’’ )-X”
= y,(~t.l>~t,c, =R,~l,x”) ,
by linearity of ~,(. )
since z>~~z), V.z
i.e., x“ prefers c1=F to c,=R, ￿l
Proof of Proposition 2. First, simplify the notation by writing VXR) -V{ (Kt.l, r,, c,=R ,3, ,x)
ail
and v,(F) -VI(K,.l, r,, c,=F,~l, x). To prove that —>0, first note that K,.l enters (7) only
dK,_,
aK(*





must be the same; in particular, these two terms vanish for the same values of Kl_,.
(i.e., the desired capital stock responds to K,., only if K,_l affects governments’ decisions),
Now note that K,.l affects v,(R) -w,(F) directly (and positively) through K,_l in W[(R),
and indirectly (and ambiguous y) through the effects of K1* on 2,+1and K[+,,... ,K~ in Vt(R ) and
ait





cannot change sign. To see this, assume the existence of a ~t.l where
ai,







results at K~_,. The terms involving — vanish, since _ –— -0 at
dK,_, dK,_l - ~K,_l
cannot hold, since
ai,
the first term is positive, and —=0 at i,.,.
dK{_,
is positive: no type would switch to controls when Kt_l=0,
whereas all types would switch to controls when K[_l~~.
ail
The proof that —>0 is
art
similar. We need only look at values of rf with binding controls.
aft
Assume the existence of a ?, where, with binding controls, _ =O. Total differentiation of
f3r,
30di
?,. However, w,(R) is independent of r, in a neighborhood of ?, (where K,= K1.l and +=0).
dK,* r
In contrast, ~jF) is decreasing in r,. To see this note that —<0 at ?, (see (5) and (6), using
a?,
ail dW(K, IC[=F) ail
—=0 at ?,); hence, <O at ?1. Furthermore, since _ =0 at ?,, lower r, affects
art dr, ar,
Kf+l,...,K~ only through a higher K,; now, since the strategy followed starting from a lower K,
can always be replicated starting from a higher Kt, then W(K,+l IC1=F),..., W(K~ Ic,=F ) cannot
~(wfR) -w,(F)) ail




change sign. Finally, no type would switch to controls
ail
switch to controls when rl+~. The sign of _ must
art
when r,=0, whereas all types would
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